New Evidence on the Size and Drivers of the Shadow Economy in Spain: A Model Averaging Approach by Rios, Vicente
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
New Evidence on the Size and Drivers of
the Shadow Economy in Spain: A Model
Averaging Approach
Rios, Vicente
Public University of Navarre
July 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97504/
MPRA Paper No. 97504, posted 17 Dec 2019 19:06 UTC
New Evidence on the Size and Drivers of the
Shadow Economy in Spain ∗
Vicente Rios
Universidad Pu´blica de Navarra
E-mail: vicente.rios@unavarra.es
Abstract
This study investigates the evolution of the shadow economy in Spain during
the period 1986-2016 using the Currency Demand Approach by means of Bayesian
Model Averaging econometric techniques. The results of the empirical analysis sug-
gest that the average share of the underground economy as a percentage of the
GDP during 1986-2016 was the 18.2% whereas in 2016, the estimated size was the
11.95%. The estimated figures for the period under consideration are in line with
the averaged estimates of previous studies for the same time frame. Nevertheless,
a remarkable difference between previous analysis and the estimated pattern stem-
ming from this study is that the size of the shadow economy depicts an inverted U
shape time profile, with a marked reduction in the years after the Great Recession.
With the estimates of the shadow economy in hand, the importance of the drivers
of the shadow economy in Spain is investigated by means of Bayesian Model Av-
eraging methods. The main finding of this analysis is that the key factors driving
variations in the size of the shadow economy are the taxes, the level of education
and the distribution of employment across sectors.
Keywords: Shadow Economy, Spain, Currency Demand, Bayesian Model Averag-
ing.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this study is to obtain estimates of the size of the shadow economy in
Spain for the period ranging from 1986 to 2016 using the Currency Demand Approach
(CDA). To that end, this study employs Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) econometric
techniques.
The shadow economy is defined as the realization of legal or illegal economic activi-
ties, which the law requires to be reported in full to the tax administration, but which
are hidden to the authorities in order to avoid paying taxes, quotes or to avoid certain
regulations or administrative procedures, OECD (2017).1
The concern and interest raised by this phenomenon has increased after the Great
Recession. According to the 2018 survey on public opinion and fiscal policy, 59.7% of
the surveyed Spanish citizens consider that tax fraud is a widespread behavior among
taxpayers (CIS, 2018). Undoubtedly, undeclared activities erode the ability to collect
revenues through the tax system causing negative distorting effects on efficiency, equity,
morality and trust in public institutions (Schneider and Enste, 2000). From a policy
perspective, the topic is relevant given that the reduction of tax fraud is a common
objective of the tax policy of most OECD countries and the European Union, because
of an improvement in the degree of tax compliance could have a positive impact on
economic activity (Caballe´ and Panade´s, 1997).
However, despite the relevance of the problem, not much is known about the magni-
tude of the underground economy as different studies provide very different estimates.
This is because of its measurement and analysis remains a challenging task (Schnei-
der and Buehn, 2017). In the empirical literature, there are two main approaches to
estimate the shadow economy: direct and indirect ones. Direct approaches refer to mi-
croeconomic approaches, that employ either well-designed surveys and samples based
1Traditionally the shadow economy has been defined as all unregistered economic activities that
would contribute to the officially calculated (or observed) Gross National Product if observed. However,
after the 2014 statistical and methodological review, some illegal activities such as prostitution, drug
sales, tobacco smuggling and illegal gambling have been included in the National Accounts of Spain, in
accordance with a new standard approved in the European Union, the so-called European System of
National and Regional Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010).
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on voluntary replies, or tax auditing and other compliance methods. While these ap-
proaches can provide detailed information they also present important drawbacks: they
are expensive to carry out, the willingness to cooperate of the respondents is low and
overall, they are likely to underestimate the shadow economy given that people are likely
to under-declare what they hide from authorities (Schneider and Buehn, 2017). On the
other hand, indirect approaches are mostly macroeconomic and use various economic
indicators that contain information about the development of the shadow economy over
time.
The most commonly employed indirect approaches to investigate the shadow econ-
omy are: (i) the Currency Demand Approach (CDA) (Tanzi, 1983; Ahumada et al.,
2007, 2008), (ii) the Physical Input (electricity consumption) method with its two vari-
ants: the Kauffmann and Kaliberda (1996) approach and the Lacko´ Approach (2000)
and finally (iii) the Multiple Indicators Multiple Cuases (MIMIC) method (Giles, 1999;
Dell’Anno et al., 2007; Schneider and Dell’Anno, 2009).2 In this study, the estimation
of the shadow economy is based on the CDA given that is the most commonly employed
framework in the empirical literature and allows to compare the BMA results obtained
here with a larger amount of previous estimates.
A review of previous empirical studies using the CDA reveals that in the economet-
ric analysis researchers usually face limited and short time-series, and as a consequence,
they restrict the number of regressors to avoid multicollinearity problems and obtain-
ing inefficient parametric estimates (see Gonza´lez-Ferna´ndez y Gonza´lez-Velasco, 2015;
Pickhardt and Sarda´, 2015). However, efficiency is obtained at the cost of a potential bias
in the parameter estimates due to the omission of potentially relevant factors. From an
econometric perspective, the omission of explanatory variables that could affect money
demand patterns is of major importance given that estimates may be inefficient and/or
biased. This is specially relevant in the CDA framework, as these estimates are used to
estimate the demand of money for hidden transactions, a key metric that serves as the
2Although there are other methods such as the (i) the discrepancy between national expenditure
and income statistics, the discrepancy between the official and actual labor force and the transactions
approach, these are of more questionable reliability (see Schneider and Buehn (2017) for a critical review
the various methods that have been used to estimate the size of the shadow economy and discuss their
strengths and weaknesses).
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basis to calculate hidden GDP. Second, by ignoring the uncertainty existing around the
currency demand model, researchers assume there is just one true model to estimate
the evolution of cash and treat the estimates as if they were from the true model, when
in fact, there are many candidate models based on the inclusion of different explana-
tory factors which have a certain probability of being the true one (Moral-Benito, 2015;
Steel, 2019). Since it is often not clear a priori which set of variables should be included
in the “true” regression model, a naive approach that ignores specification and data
uncertainty results in biased estimates , overconfident (too naroow) standard errors and
misleading inference and predictions (Doppelhofer and Weeks, 2009).
In this regard, the key contribution of this study to the measurement of the shadow
economy is methodological given that the BMA analysis performed here is based on a
large set of regressors and allows to solve the aforementioned problems. This procedure
allows to properly account for model uncertainty, reducing biases due to omitted vari-
ables and avoids the problems caused by multicollinearity, when there is a large number
of potential factors driving currency demand and the sample size of the study is small.
In a second step, with the estimated size of the shadow economy in hand, BMA is
employed to produce a probabilistic ranking of the various determinants of the shadow
economy in Spain.
The document is organized as follows. In Section (2) the theoretical framework
underlying the CDA is presented. Section (3) reviews the literature and presents a
collection of the estimates of the size of the shadow economy, based on ten previous
studies using the CDA in Spain for the time-frame considered. Section (4) discusses the
empirical strategy to obtain estimates and presents the data set employed in the analysis.
Section (5) discusses the results of the Bayesian analysis of the demand of currency and
presents the estimates on the size shadow economy. Section (6) analyzes the drivers of
the shadow economy in Spain whereas Section (7) offers the main conclusions of this
research.
3
2 Theoretical Framework
The CDA assumes that opaque transactions are carried out in the form of cash
payments, with the objective of leaving no traces traceable to the authorities. The
intuition behind this assumption is that while transactions made with cash are difficult
to track, those made with other forms of money, recorded in financial institutions, can
be easily inspected. Therefore, an increase in the shadow economy will tend to increase
the demand for currency or cash. The second assumption is that if there were no taxes,
the incentives to carry out opaque transactions would also disappear. Therefore, a key
idea that underlies this approach is that, keeping everything else constant, high tax
levels should translate into a larger size of the shadow economy. This point has been
confirmed in other international studies (Dell’Anno et al., 2007, Schneider, 2005).
As pointed out by Ahumada et al. (2008), currency demand can be expressed by
means of a Cagan (1958) function as in Equation (1):
COt = A (1 + θt)
α Y φOte
−δit (1)
where COt denotes currency in t, θt is a fiscal variable that induces agents to operate in
the underground sector, YOt is a scale variable such as the observed GDP, it measures
the opportunity cost of holding cash (i.e, the interest rate or inflation) and A, α, φ y
δ are parameters that take positive values. Observable currency (COt), is equal to the
total amount of cash (CTt), which includes currency used for registered transactions
(CRt) and for hidden ones (CSt):
COt = CTt = CRt + CSt (2)
Thus, this expression can be rewritten as:
CTt = AY
φ
Rte
−δit +AY φSte
−δit = AY φRte
−δit
(
1 +
YSt
YRt
)φ
(3)
Observed GDP (YOt), is registered GDP (YRt) and does not include shadow GDP (YSt).
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Therefore:
YTt = YOt + YSt = YRt + YSt (4)
For this reason, the size of the shadow economy in the GDP can be obtained by imposing
θt = 0 in Equation (1) to obtain an estimate of the demand of currency when there are
no incentives to perform hidden transactions CˆRt:
CˆRt = AˆY
φˆ
Ote
−δˆit (5)
Given that CˆRt is known by the previous equation and CTt is observable (i.e COt), then
the demand of cash for hidden transactions can be obtained as the difference:
CˆSt = CTt − CˆRt (6)
The ratio between CRt and CSt is given by:
CRt
CSt
=
AY φRte
−δit
AY φSte
−δit
=
(
YRt
YSt
)φ
(7)
Once CˆSt is estimated, in order to determine the size of the shadow economy the quan-
titative Fisher Equation M × V = P × T is employed. In the Fisher’s equation, M is
money, V is the speed of money, and the right hand side is the value of all the trans-
actions of goods and services. Since P × T is unknown the practical implementation
requires to assume that P × T is well approximated by nominal GDP. To estimate the
size of the shadow economy, the literature has assumed that velocity in the hidden sector
and the official sector are the same (i.e, vRt/vSt = 1), such that:
vRt =
YRt
CRt
=
YSt
CSt
(8)
Hence, the size of the shadow economy (YSt) can be obtained as:
YˆSt = vˆRtCˆSt (9)
5
where YˆSt is the estimate of the shadow economy obtained using CˆSt from Equation
(6). However, as pointed out by Ahumada et al. (2008) the YˆSt estimate based on
Equation (9) will be biased if the money velocities in the underground and official sector
are different from each other (i.e, vRt 6= vSt). This can be corroborated easily computing
the ratio of the speeds which is given by:
vSt
vRt
=
(
YSt
YRt
)1−φ
(10)
Equation (10) shows that the assumption of equal speeds in both sectors is only correct if
φ = 1, or in the unlikely situation of YRt = YSt. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests
that φ 6= 1. Mark and Soul (2003) report a value of 1.2, Hamori and Hamori (2008)
obtain a value of 4.13, whereas in Gonza´lez-Ferna´ndez and Gonza´lez-Velasco (2015) this
parameter oscillates between [1.15-1.34]. Thus, ignoring this point can be troublesome
to obtain reliable estimates. Recognizing that the value of v depends on the estimated
value of φˆ, implies the correct expression to calculate the shadow economy with respect
to the GDP is given by:
SEt =
(
YSt
YRt
)
=
(
CˆSt
CRt
) 1
φˆ
(11)
Previous equation shows how to obtain the ratio of the shadow economy with respect the
GDP given YRt, CRt, CˆSt y φˆ. Since the work of Ahumada et al. (2007), this correction
has been applied in different studies (see Macias and Cazzavillan, 2009; Pickhardt and
Sarda´, 2015; Gonza´lez-Ferna´ndez and Gonza´lez-Velasco, 2015; among others).
3 What do we know about the size of the shadow economy
in Spain?
This section draws from the literature review on the size of the shadow economy
in Spain by Vaquero-Garc´ıa et al. (2018). In their review, they find ten different time
series/cross-sectional data studies employing the CDA for Spain. The results of the
existing evidence on the size of the shadow economy are shown in Figure (1)
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Go´mez de Antonio and Alan˜o´n (2004), estimate that the underground economy in
Spain during the 1980-2000 period oscillated between 18% and 21.2% of GDP. On the
other hand, Serrano-Sanz et al. (1998) detected an increase in the shadow economy
during the first decade of the sample period (8 % of GDP in 1986 to 14.1% in 1995).
Mauleo´n and Sarda´ (1997) for the period 1986-1996 find that the shadow economy was
on average the 16.6% of GDP. Prado (2004) quantifies that in 1986 the size was 17.4%
it increased until 1995 with a value of the 26.9% and that later decreased to 17.8% in
2001. In Labeaga (2014) it is estimated that during the 2008-2012 period the size of the
shadow economy was the 25.9%, moving from 28.5 % in 2008 to 26.2% in 2012.
The estimate based on the monetary method of Arrazola et al. (2011) points to
an increase from the 9.5% in 1986 to the 26.4% in 2007, and a sharp fall with the
outbreak of the crisis, rising later on to 21.3% in 2008. Finally, Pickhardt and Sarda´
(2015, use a monetary model to conclude that the underground economy during 1986-
1996 was around 29.8%, decreased to 23.66% during 1997-2006 and that it bounced
back between 2007 and 2009. These studies, which only use information from Spain, are
complemented with the estimations of Dell’Anno et al. (2007) and Feld and Schneider
(2010) that also use the monetary method to estimate the size of the informal sector in
a panel of countries.
The average estimate of the shadow economy in Spain considering previous studies
using the CDA for the period 1986-2016 is 20.9% of the GDP, with a standard deviation
of the 2.28%. The observed pattern suggests an increase from the 16.57% in 1986
(which is the minimum value) to the 25.01% in 1997. A decrease until 2006 and then a
rebound until the year 2011. While for the period ranging 1986-2007 there are numerous
estimates, after the Great Recession to the year 2016, the number of estimates decreases.
Thus, the U-shapped pattern observed from 1986-2007 is more reliable than the observed
increase from 2008 to 2013.
In any case, given that the estimation of the evolution of the shadow economy in
Spain is an empirical question, the rest of the study is devoted to obtain new estimates
of this key variable.
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Figure 1: Previous Shadow Economy Estimates 1986-2016
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4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 The econometrics of the CDA
Most of CDA empirical studies draw from the pioneering analysis of Tanzi (1983).3
The time-series model that is taken as a basis to estimate the underground economy in
Spain is given by the Equation (12):
lnCt = β0 + β1FPt + β2 lnYt + β3Rt + β4Πt + γZt + ǫt (12)
where lnCt is a T × 1, vector of observations of the logarithm of currency in real terms,
FPt is a variable that measures fiscal pressure (expressed as a percentage of GDP),
lnYt is the logarithm real GDP, Rt is the money interest rate, Πt is the inflation rate
calculated using 2010 as the base year. The term ǫt is a vector of random perturbations
or shocks to currency demand, which is assumed to follow a normal distribution such
that ǫt ∼ N
(
0, σ2ǫ
)
.
Once the Equation (12), is estimated, the demand of currency attributable to hidden
activities CˆSt can be obtained using the condition βˆ1 = 0 in order to obtain the counter-
factual value Cˆt|βˆ1 = 0,
~ˆ
βk. Note that the predicted Cˆt|β1 = 0,
~ˆ
βk is different to Cˆt|
~ˆ
βk
if the effect of the fiscal indicator is different from zero (i.e, if in Equation (12) β1 6= 0).
While the second term refers to currency demand predicted by the model using all
the regressors and their respective parameters, the first fit is equivalent to performing a
counter-factual asking: “What would have been the demand of currency if fiscal pressure
had been the 0% or if ∆FPt = 0?”. Thus, the demand of currency that can be attributed
to shadow economy activities because of the existence of taxes is given by:4
CˆSt = exp
[(
ln Cˆt|
~ˆ
βk
)
−
(
ln Cˆt|βˆ1 = 0,
~ˆ
βk
)]
(13)
3A problem with the specification int he original work of Tanzi (1983) is that the dependent variable
in that case is a ratio of monetary aggregates ln
(
C
M2
)
t
, which does not allow to capture the elasticity
of money demand with respect income.
4This is the procedure by which one can obtain Equation (6) in Section (2).
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With the base estimate of the demand of currency for hidden activities in hand (CˆSt),
the next step is to transform the data into a time series of hidden GDP (i.e, YSt). To
that end, it is necessary to use an estimate of money velocity v. As discussed in Section
(2), usually, the following formula is employed:
YˆSt = vˆCˆSt (14)
However, if βˆ2 6= 1 (the φ parameter in Section (2), one should correct for the elasticity
of money with respect to income as follows:
YSt
YOt
=
[
YˆSt
YOt
] 1
βˆ2
(15)
where YˆSt is obtained by means of Equation (14).
As observed, in the process of estimation of the shadow economy, there are to key
parameters that come from the econometric estimation which deserve special attention
to obtain reliable estimates. The first one is βˆ1, which is the parameter associated
to the fiscal indicator whose variation is assumed to influence shadow activities. An
accurate estimation of this parameter is crucial to obtain the difference between (Cˆt)
and Cˆt|β1 = 0 .The second is βˆ2, as it defines the magnitude of the adjustment of the
initial ratio YˆSt
YOt
in Equation (15).
4.2 Bayesian Model Averaging
Denoting by yt = lnCt, Xt the T × 5 the matrix that collects the constant of
the model, the macroeconomic variables and the fiscal aggregate, such that Xt =
[ιt, FPt, lnYt, Rt,Πt] where ιt is a vector of ones of size T × 1, the previous model can
be expressed in a compact form:
yt = βXt + γZt+ ǫt (16)
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In the Equation (16) the distinction between X and Z is made since, for consistency
with the theoretical framework, the regressors included in X should always be part of
the model that explains the time variation of currency. Nevertheless, Thomas (1999)
points out that the miss-specification of the currency demand model may have important
effects in the estimation of the shadow economy due to the biases implied by omitted
variables. For this reason in the empirical specification Zt includes a large variety of
potential factors that could affect the demand for money and whose inclusion as part
of the specification is uncertain (monetary events, temporary trends, socio-demographic
characteristics, labor market and productive structure features, etc).
Let γ be of size K1 × 1 and Z of size T ×K1. Note that there are many sub-models
Mk of the model in Equation (16) given by the subsets of coefficients η
k =
(
β, γk
)
and combinations of regressors k ∈
[
0, 2K1
]
where K1 is the total number of non-fixed
regressors in Z. A number of questions arise when there are many potential explanatory
variables in Z. Which set of variables Zk ∈ Z should be then included in the model?
And how important are they? Model averaging techniques solve these questions by
estimating all the candidate models implied by the combinations of regressors in Z (or
a relevant sample of them) and computing a weighted average of all the estimates of
the corresponding parameter related to Zh (the sub-index h denotes a single regressor
and not a model or a combination of regressors k). By proceeding in this way, BMA
estimates consider both the uncertainty associated to the parameter estimate conditional
on a given model, but also the uncertainty of the parameter estimate across different
models. In general, this approach leads to wider confidence intervals for the estimated
effect of the exogenous regressors X˜ = [X,Z] on y.
By following the Bayesian logic, the posterior for the parameters ηk calculated using
model Mk is written as:
g
(
ηk|y, X˜Mk
)
=
f
(
y, X˜|ηk,Mk
)
g (ηk|Mk)
f
(
y, X˜|Mk
) (17)
where g
(
ηk|y, X˜Mk
)
is the posterior, f
(
y, X˜|ηk,Mk
)
is the likelihood and g (ηk|Mk)
is the prior. The key metrics in BMA analysis are the Posterior Mean (PM) of the
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distribution of η:
E
(
η|y, X˜
)
=
2K1∑
k=1
E
(
ηk|Mk, y, X˜
)
p
(
Mk|y, X˜
)
(18)
and the Posterior Standard Deviation (PSD):
PSD =
√
V ar
(
η|y, X˜
)
(19)
where the V ar
(
η|y, X˜
)
is given by:
V ar (η|y,X) =
∑2K1
k=1 V ar
(
ηk|Mk, y, X˜
)
p
(
Mk|y, X˜
)
+ (20)
∑2K1
k=1
(
E
(
ηk|Mk, y, X˜
)
− E
(
η|y, X˜
))2
p
(
Mk|y, X˜
)
To derive these metrics, it is necessary to calculate the Posterior Model Probability
p (Mk|y,X) of each of the sub-models Mk. These can be obtained as:
p
(
Mk|y, X˜
)
=
p
(
y, X˜|Mk
)
p (Mk)∑2K1
k=1 p
(
y, X˜|Mk
)
p (Mk)
(21)
where p
(
y, X˜|Mk
)
is the marginal likelihood and p (Mk) is the prior model probability.
The marginal likelihood of a model k is calculated as:
p
(
y, X˜|Mk
)
=
∫
∞
0
∫
∞
−∞
p
(
y, X˜|ηk, σ
2,Mk
)
p
(
ηk, σ
2|g
)
dηdσ (22)
where p
(
y, X˜|ηk, σ
2,Mk
)
is the likelihood of model k and p
(
ηk, σ
2|g
)
is the prior dis-
tribution of the parameters in model Mk conditional to g, the Zellgner’s g-prior. In
addition, the BMA framework can be extended to generate probabilistic on the rele-
vance of the various regressors, using the Posterior Inclusion Probability (PIP) for a
12
variable h:
p
(
ηh 6= 0|y, X˜
)
=
2K1∑
k=1
p
(
Mk|ηh 6= 0, y, X˜
)
(23)
In addition, it is possible to compute the Conditional Posterior Positivity of h:
p
(
ηh ≥ 0|y, X˜
)
=
2K1∑
k=1
p
(
ηk,h|Mk, y, X˜
)
p
(
Mk|y, X˜
)
(24)
where values of conditional positivity close to 1 indicate that the parameter is positive
in the vast majority of considered models and values close to 0 indicate the effect on the
dependent variable is negative.
The calculation of previous metrics in the BMA approach requires to define priors
on the model space and priors on the parameter space. As the baseline prior on the
parameter space a Zellgner g-prior is implemented based on the Bayesian Risk Inflation
Criterion (BRIC), whereas a Binomial prior on the model space is adjusted, such that
every model has the same a priori probability.5
As regards, the numerical implementation of the BMA, a Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Model Composition (MC3) methodology proposed by Madigan and York (1995) based
on the so called “reverse jump” algorithm is employed to explore the model space. The
algorithm operates in the model space as follows. If we let M denote the current state
of the chain, models are proposed using a neighborhood , nbd(M) which consists on the
model itself and models containing either one variable more (birth step) or one variable
less (death step) thanM . A transition matrix q, is defined by setting q(M →M ′) = 0 for
all M ′ /∈ nbd(M) and q(M → M ′) constant for all M ′ ∈ nbd(M). The proposed model
5In particular, the g-prior hyper-parameter takes the value of gk = max
{
N,K21
}
such that g(ηk) ∼
N
[
0, σ2g
(
X˜
′
kX˜k
)−1]
. The Binomial prior on the model space, regulates prior model probabilities
according to p (Mk) = φ
k (1− φ)K1−k, where each covariate k is included in the model with a probability
of success φ. I set φ = 1/2 which assigns equal probability p (Mk) = 2
−K1 to all the models under
consideration.
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M ′, is compared with the current model state M using the acceptance probability:
P = min

1, p
(
M ′|y, X˜
)
p
(
M |y, X˜
)

 (25)
In addition, to the sampling based on (birth steps) and (death steps) to the chain of
models, the algorithm also implements amove step which consists on replacing randomly
variables in X˜ with variables not included currently in the model. The key feature of
this econometric procedure is that it eliminates the need to consider all possible models
by constructing a sampler that explores relevant parts of the large model space.
Before continuining, a difference between the BMA-CDA analysis carried out in this
study with respect traditional BMA exercises should be stressed. The BMA-CDA in
this analysis does not rely exclusively on the model composition algorithm described
above, given that in order to accept the model as a valid candidate to the estimate
of the shadow economy, the following restrictions are imposed in the model space: (i)
0% ≥
YS,0
YO,0
≤ 50%, (ii)
YS,F
YO,F
≥ 2.5% and (iii) βˆ1 ≥ 0. The restriction (i) is used to filter
out absurd models with initial estimates for the initial period that due to numerical
problems might give negative ratios or values above the 50% of the GDP, which is an
extremely high magnitude far above all the reported estimates in the literature. The
second restriction implies discarding models that point to a ratio of the shadow economy
below the 2.5% in the final period, which much lower than the last available estimate
in the literature. Finally, restriction (iii) discards models for which the theoretical core
of the CDA does not hold (i.e, it excludes models in which the effect of increasing
taxes decreases the demand of currency). Overall, this set of restrictions ensure shadow
economy estimates to be produced by models conformable with the CDA theory and
that the figures are not unreasonable due to bad model draws.
4.3 Data
This section describes the data set employed in the CDA-BMA analysis.
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4.3.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the amount of cash held by the public (currency in circula-
tion) in real terms based on data obtained from the Bank of Spain.6 The price deflator
used to obtain the amount of currency expressed in real terms, which is the variable
of interest in the econometric model, comes from De la Fuente (2017a) and takes 2010
as base year, such that P2010 = 1. Figure (2) shows the evolution of the quantity of
currency in Spain during the sample period. As it is observed, with the introduction of
the euro, the ammount of currency decreased far below its previous trend. It grew until
2008 and since the outbreak of the Great Recession, it decreased sharply. Overall, the
temporal pattern depicted in Figure (2) is that of an inverted U with a peak in 2008.
4.3.2 Fiscal indicators
The key explanatory variable that encourages the demand for cash for hidden trans-
actions in the CDA is the fiscal pressure. The intuition is that some individuals in the
society may decide that the burden of paying taxes is greater than the benefits obtained
through the provision of public goods and services. Thus, high tax levels should trans-
late into a larger size of the shadow economy given that incentives to move from the
formal to the informal sector would be greater in this context. For the period 1986-2016
the fiscal data have been taken from the annual reports of the Spanish Tax Agency.
In this analysis, the following ratios are taken into account as candidates to define the
fiscal pressure: (i) the aggregate fiscal pressure is calculated as the ratio of the sum of
social contributions and total tax collection to GDP (FPAt), (ii) the total fiscal pressure
excluding social contributions (FPt), (iii) the direct fiscal pressure (DIRt), (iv) indirect
fiscal pressure (INDIRt), (v) the ratio of Personal Income Tax to GDP (PITt), (vi)
6The INE identifier for the time series of Currency in circulation and deposits of resident banking
institutions in the Bank of Spain is “FMI62 - Central Bank Accounts”. This time series is initially
calculated in monthly frequency and covers the period 2001-2016 On the other hand, the Bank of Spain
on its website, provides data for the period 1962-2001, also in monthly frequency https://www.bde.es/
webbde/es/estadis/infoest/bolest7.html. These data have been compared with those of the IMF
to ensure consistency in the period considered with the other monetary macro magnitudes such as M1,
M2 and M3. This is issue is relevant as the proper measurement of money in circulation affects the
estimation of the velocity vˆ in Equation (14). Since the rest of the variables of the model are measured
in annual frequency, the money data of each year are obtained as the mean over the 12 months of the
year.
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Figure 2: The Evolution of Currency in Spain
the ratio of the collection of the Value Added Tax with respect to the GDP (V ATt) and
(vii) the ratio of the Corporate Tax with respect to the GDP (CTt).
4.3.3 Other explanatory factors
The set of variables included in the matrices Xt and Zt considered in the analysis
other than fiscal indicators whose omission could bias the estimates of the response of
money to changes in taxes and the elasticity of money with respect income, refer to (i)
macroeconomic factors, (ii) socio-demographic characteristics (iii) productive structure
characteristics and (iv) monetary events. The descriptive statistics and the respective
sources of all the variables used in the analysis are shown in the Table (A1) in the
Appendix.
The econometric model proposed in Equation (16) explains the variations in demand
for money as a result of changes in (i) the logarithm of real GDP (RGDPt), (ii) the
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nominal interest rate (Rt), (iii) the inflation rate (Πt), (iv) the unemployment rate (Ut),
(v) the share of wages in the total income (WSt) and (vi) the logarithm of the number
of hours worked per capita (HOURSt). The historical data of real GDP and the share
of wages in total income have been obtained from De la Fuente (2017a, b), the interest
rate is taken from the Bank of Spain, inflation has been calculated as the annual growth
rate of the nominal GDP price deflator calculated with the linked series of De la Fuente
(2017a) and the unemployment rate was obtained from the series of unemployed and
active population of De la Fuente (2017b). Additionally, demographic factors that could
be related to the demand for cash haven been considered, such as the (vii) net migratory
balance (MIGt) and (viii) the average number of years of education of the population
(EDUCt). The data comes from De la Fuente (2017c).
The productive structure and the industry mix might also be correlated with money
in circulation, tax pressure and income. According to Schneider (2013), the construction
sector has historically been very susceptible to underground activities. The estimate for
Spain is that approximately the 31% of activity in this sector is shadow economy. The
wholesale sector is the second in size, with a 20%. For other sectors such as agriculture
or manufacturing, the estimates presented are around the 15%. Since the productive
structure of the Spanish economy has changed significantly during the study period and
different sectors can have different levels of hidden activity, the shares in employment
of the various sectors with respect to the total employment are included. In particu-
lar, (ix) agricultural (AGRIt), (x) construction (CONSt), (x) industrial (INDt), (xi)
non-market services (NMSt), (xii) financial services (FINt) and (xiii) wholesale ser-
vices, retail, transportation, lodging and food, information and communication (Other
services, OSt). The data comes from the database Cambridge Econometrics 2017.
Moreover, during the period under consideration, there are two drastic monetary and
financial events that may have had an effect on the demand for currency: (xiv) the entry
into the euro zone (EURt) and (xv) the outbreak of the financial crisis (CRISISt). As
observed in Figure (2), in the year of entry into the euro zone, there was a significant
fall in cash due to the uncertainty associated with the new currency. The reaction
of citizens was to convert cash into other monetary instruments such as deposits and
long-run deposits. A second event is linked to the outbreak of the financial crisis and
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the burst of the housing bubble. To control for these events, two dummy variables are
created. The dummy variable of the Euro takes value 1 from 2002 onwards while the
dummy variable of the financial crisis takes the value of 1 in the 2008-2013 interval and
0 otherwise.
Finally, with the aim of improving the fit to the data, a linear and a quadratic trend
are included to capture the non-linear evolution of currency depicted in Figure (2).
5 Estimates of the Shadow Economy in Spain
Table (1) reports the results obtained from the BMA analysis when the dependent
variable is natural logarithm of real currency in circulation. However, before continuing
with the discussion of the results, it is worth mentioning the problems that the method-
ology applied here is able to solve and those problems that may persist, affecting the
quality of the estimates. The strong point of the BMA methodology employed here is
that it accounts for the uncertainty of the parameter estimates across different models
while controlling for omitted variable bias (Moral-Benito, 2015; Steel, 2019). However,
it does not correct for the potential negative effect of endogeneity generated by reverse
causal relationships or measurement errors. Thus, the results should be interpreted with
caution. In fact, how to tackle the issue of endogeneity in a model averaging framework
is an important line of open research.7
The PIPs of the different variables are scaled in intervals to classify evidence of
robustness of currency drivers into two categories so that regressors with PIP ∈ [0−50%]
are considered as weak determinants and variables with PIP ∈ [50−100%] as significant
determinants. This metric is reported in Column (1). Besides the factors included in X
which are always part of the model, the only important drivers in Z are the quadratic
trend (96.9%), the net migration (71.2%) and the hours worked (54.5%). Finally, weak
currency demand drivers include a myriad of factors related to the composition of the
productive structure (e.g. agriculture, industry, financial services, non-market services),
7This is because in the context of endogenous regressors the model posterior probabilities are based
on pseudo-likelihoods that are not fully comparable across models.
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financial and monetary events or the distribution of income.
Table 1: Baseline Results (fiscal pressure including social contributions)
Variable PIP Cond. Post. Cond Post . Cond. Post Cond Post. Cond Post
Mean Std Sign Mean Std
(1) (2) (3) (4) & Restrict(5) & Restrict (6)
Fiscal pressure(a) 1 1.045 1.498 0.805 1.761 1.559
Real GDP 1 3.41 1.555 0.979 3.103 2.566
Inflation rate 1 2.463 1.941 0.963 1.236 2.660
Interest rate 1 1.173 1.617 0.798 0.126 1.617
Quadratic trend 0.969 -0.003 0.001 0 -0.002 0.001
Net migration 0.712 -0.098 0.036 0 -0.086 0.045
Hours Worked 0.545 -2.968 1.174 0.001 -2.761 2.144
Education 0.483 1.088 0.692 0.999 1.437 0.966
Other Servs. 0.378 9.996 4.967 0.998 11.474 6.672
Unemployment rate 0.361 3.733 1.875 0.969 3.147 0.346
Linear trend 0.28 -0.169 0.152 0.162 -0.249 0.169
Non Market Servs. 0.168 -2.305 4.438 0.169 0.131 2.078
Euro 0.123 -0.111 0.102 0.058 -0.061 0.055
Financial Servs. 0.107 4.452 4.108 0.981 1.578 2.083
Industry 0.09 -2.799 4.06 0.172 -4.193 4.786
Crisis 0.088 0.077 0.089 0.922 0.112 0.073
Agriculture 0.077 -0.556 6.856 0.546 -13.258 8.455
Wage Share 0.07 0.141 1.684 0.561 0.782 0.794
Construction 0.069 1.426 2.437 0.868 3.421 1.842
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions the logarithm of real currency. Prior mean model size is 11.5 whereas
posterior mean model size is 8.5. Variables are ranked by Column (1), the posterior inclusion probability. Columns
(2) and (3) reflect the posterior mean and standard deviations for the linear marginal effect of the variable conditional
on inclusion in the model, respectively. Column (4) denotes the sign certainty probability, a measure of the posterior
confidence in the sign of the coefficient. The results reported in Columns (2) to (4) correspond to the estimation of the
top 10,000 models from the 524288 million possible regressions including any combination of the 19 variables whereas the
the results reported in Columns (5) and (6) correspond to the estimation of the models that satisfy the restrictions in
Section (4.2). (a) The fiscal pressure indicator employed in these regressions is the FPAt including social contributions.
Columns (2) and (3) report the mean and the standard deviation of the posterior
parameters distributions, conditional on the variable being included in the model.8 To
complement these statistics, Column (4) presents the results of the posterior sign cer-
tainty, which measures the posterior probability of a positive coefficient expected value,
conditional on inclusion. For the factors included in X, which are always part of the
model, it is found that the tax pressure (80.5%), real GDP (97.9%), inflation rate (96.3%)
and interest rates (79.8%) present a high sign certainty, exerting positive effects on the
amount of cash. Note that while the positive impacts of the fiscal indicator and income
8The key difference with respect to unconditional posterior estimates of Equations (18) and (19) is
that conditional posterior estimates for a particular variable are obtained as the weighted average over
the models where the variable is included. On the contrary, the unconditional posterior estimate is
the averaged coefficient over all models, including those in which the variable does not appear, hence
having a zero coefficient. Thus, the unconditional posterior mean can be computed by multiplying the
conditional mean in Column (3) times the PIP in Column (1)
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are in line with the CDA, the positive effect of inflation and interest rate are not, since
these factors in the CDA are expected to capture the opportunity cost of holding cash.
Columns (6) and (7) report the conditional mean and the standard deviation of the pos-
terior parameter distributions for the sampled models that satisfy conditions outlined in
Section (4.2). These are the parameter estimates used to obtain (Cˆt) and Cˆt|β1 = 0. As
observed, the posterior of mean of fiscal pressure is 1.76 whereas the elasticity of money
with respect income is 3.1, which is in the range of previous studies.
Using the probabilistic weighted average of the natural logarithm of the real cash for
the set of models sampled by the algorithm MC3 that also satisfy the restrictions, the
adjustment to the demand of currency (ln Cˆt) is obtained and shown in the Figure (3).
9
The red dashed line in Figure (3a) represents the model’s fit using all information[
ln Cˆt|
~ˆ
βk
]
, while the black solid line represents the historical trajectory. As can be seen,
except for the year 2002, which corresponds to the entry in the euro, the adjustment of
the model to the data is quite satisfactory given that it replicates quite accurately the
movements in time of the currency. On the other hand, the dash-dot blue line is the
counter-factual of the hypothetical evolution of the logarithm of cash money “shutting
down” the effect of changes in taxes (i.e, the term
[
ln Cˆt|βˆ1 = 0,
~ˆ
βk
]
of the Equation
(13)). The difference between the two time series gives us the amount of cash which
can be attributed to hidden or underground transactions (ln CˆSt), whose evolution is
plotted in Figure (3b). As observed, the evolution of the currency held by the public
for hidden activities has its maximum in the year 2007 which coincides with the peak
of the housing bubble. Specifically, in the year 2007, the estimated amount of currency
for hidden activities was 19,414 millions of euros.
With the estimate of the currency for hidden transactions, velocity of monetary
circulation is applied using the corresponding monetary aggregate and Fisher’s equation.
9The estimates of Cˆt and CˆSt in line with the BMA framework are obtained as the probabilistic
weighted average of all the specific Cˆt and CˆSt predicted by each model Mk such that:
CˆSt = e
∑
2
K
k=1(ln CˆSt|Mk,C,X˜)p
(
Mk|C, X˜
)
Cˆt = e
∑
2
K
k=1(ln Cˆt|Mk,C,X˜)p
(
Mk|C, X˜
)
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Figure 3: Currency demand estimates
(a) Total currency demand
(b) Currency demand for hidden transactions
21
The velocity of monetary circulation is obtained by solving Fisher’s equation using data
from a monetary aggregate and nominal GDP. As discussed by Gadea and Serrano-
Sanz (2002) and Gonza´lez-Ferna´ndez y Gonza´lez-Velasco (2015) the selection of the
monetary aggregate is a relevant issue in the computation of the shadow economy.
The use of smaller monetary aggregates implies a greater speed of circulation in the
underground economy than in the rest of the economy while, on the contrary, the use of
broader monetary aggregates goes with the assumption of a slower speed of circulation
in the informal sector. The speed of circulation of hidden money could be faster due
to the productive structure of the informal sector, or slower due to a higher level of
accumulation. In this context, the researcher should use a broad monetary indicator
that reflects savings decisions, but not in the same proportion as in the official economy,
since economic agents will prefer to save with legal money where there are higher returns
and use cash for current transactions. According to Gadea and Serrano-Sanz (2002),
because of hidden activities can not benefit from the returns provided by other liquid
assets available as forms of payment, the use ofM1 could lead to an overvaluation of the
size of the informal sector, since its speed has increased in recent years due to financial
innovation. Due to these issues, most of the empirical studies use the velocities implied
by the monetary aggregates M2 and M3. In this analysis, the average velocity implied
by M2 and M3 is taken as the estimate of vˆ in Equation (14).
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Using βˆ2, the first estimate of YˆSt is corrected using Equation (15). Figure (4)
displays the results of this procedure and reports the model averaged estimates of
YˆS,t
YO,t
:
SˆEt =
YˆS,t
YO,t
=
(
YˆS,t|Mk
YO,t
)
p (Mk) (26)
In addition, Figure (4) reports the results of the BMA-CDA and the average estimate
of the size of the shadow economy implied by the previous literature using the CDA
framework. The distribution of the estimates of
YˆS,t
YO,t
for t = 1986, . . . , 2016 is simulated
by means of a Monte Carlo simulation of the distribution N (µt, σt), where µt is the
mean size of the shadow economy at time t and the standard deviation at each period
10Figure (A1) in the Appendix depicts the evolution of the velocity of the different monetary aggregates
considered. As observed the money velocity ofM2M3 has decreased over time and lies within the speeds
implied by M2 and M3
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σt, reflects the variability of the shadow economy estimate across models and within
models.11 This distribution is used to construct confidence intervals. Previous literature
estimates are in line with the mean estimate of the BMA and fall within the upper 95%
and lower 5% confidence bands for most of the period under consideration. In fact, the
average size of the shadow economy for the study period implied by the BMA is the
21.05%, whereas the average in the literature is the 20.9% of the GDP. The similarity in
the estimated pattern is specially remarkable in the first twenty-five years, where both
predict an increase in the size of the shadow economy and then a decrease until the year
2007. However, the maximum size in the BMA using the FPA indicator (a 25.3% of the
GDP) is obtained in year 1995, whereas the peak in the literature occurs in 1997 (with
a 25.01% of the GDP). After achieving its maximum in the 90’s, both predict a decrease
until 2007. However, while previous literature suggests a rebound and a raising ratio
after the Great Recession, BMA estimates suggest a continuous decrease of the ratio of
the underground economy with respect the GDP. In fact, the figure of shadow economy
estimated by the BMA in the year 2016 is the 13.95% of the GDP.
11The uncertainty on the size of the shadow economy is computed as σt =
√
V ar
(
YˆS,t
YO,t
)
which is
given by:
V ar
(
YˆS,t
YO,t
)
=
2
K1∑
k=1
p (Mk)V ar
[
YˆS,t
YO,t
|Mk
]
+
2
K1∑
k=1
p (Mk)
[
YˆS,t
YO,t
− E
(
YˆS,t
YO,t
)]2
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Figure 4: Shadow Economy Estimates: 1986-2016
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As regards the estimation of the shadow economy, it is important to recall that
different fiscal indicators may produce different results. For this reason, researchers
usually report estimates of the impacts of different fiscal variables such as direct taxes,
indirect taxes or social contributions as a robustness checks (see Arrazola et al., 2011;
Gonza´lez-Ferna´ndez and Gonza´lez-Velasco, 2015). However, the question of how much
one should trust the estimate implied by a specific tax variable is difficult to solve in
a frequentist framework. Nevertheless, this issue can be easily solved within a BMA
framework by calculating the marginal likelihoods of all the models of each indicator,
integrating over them to derive a new set of model probabilities p (Mk)
′ and weighting
the underground economy estimates by their corresponding probability. The results of
the BMA using all the information of all the sampled models for each indicator are
reported in Figure (5).
The Figure (5) shows that models that generated higher shadow economy size predic-
tions based on the PIT, the VAT or the FPA indicators are unlikely to be the true data
generating process driving currency demand and therefore, the higher shadow economy
ratios implied by these indicators might not be good descriptions of reality.12 In fact
the final result of applying the BMA for all the indicators implies a lower size than that
of the baseline FPA indicator used as a baseline, as it yields a historical average for the
size of the hidden sector of 18.2% which is lower than the 21.05%. Notice that although
the temporal U-shapped pattern is very similar, the decrease after 2007 in the BMA
is much more pronounced. This estimate suggests that by the year 2016, the shadow
economy ratio in Spain was the 11.95%.
12The estimated weights to produce the Bayesian Model Averaged estimate across all models for all the
indicators are: DIRt = 0.06, INDIRt = 0.23, FPt = 0.18, FPAt = 0.07, V ATt = 0.02, PIT = 0.00,
CTt = 0.43.
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Figure 5: Shadow Economy Estimates: Alternative Fiscal Indicators
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6 The Drivers of the Shadow economy in Spain
6.1 Baseline results
In this section, the drivers of the evolution of the shadow economy in Spain are
investigated by means of the BMA econometric procedure. At the international level
there is a consensus that some country characteristics such as (i) the tax burden, (ii)
the quality of the institutions, (iii) the regulatory intensity, (iv) the fiscal morale, or
(iv) deterrence help to explain differentials in the size of the underground economy
(Johnson et al. 1998, Friedman et al., 2000; Feld and Schneider, 2010; Schneider and
Williams, 2013). However, these are mostly slow-moving variables for which the are no
available time-series covering the period under consideration. For this reason, this study
focuses is on the alternative set of (i) macroeconomic factors, (ii) socio-demographic
characteristics (iii) productive structure characteristics and (iv) monetary events, that
have been employed before as controls in the CDA.
Again, the PIPs of the variables and the previous classification in two levels: [0-
50%] and [50%-100%] are used to analyze the importance of the regressors. The most
significant determinants of the evolution of the shadow economy in Spain are (i) the
average years of education (92.6 %), (ii) the ratio of the VAT revenues to GDP (88.2
%), (iii) the share of the agricultural sector in total employment (88 %), (iv) the crisis
dummy (85.9%), (v) the ratio of the CT revenues to GDP (85.7 %), (vi) the share of
financial services in the total employment (83.7%) and (vii) the share of the construction
sector in the employment (66.6%). The unemployment rate has a PIP of the 48.9%,
which in this context is slightly below the cut-off the 50% which is the prior probability
of inclusion. Nevertheless, since the posterior mean size is of 8 regressors, it seems
reasonable to consider it as a significant determinant.
As observed, the certainty of the impacts across models for these top variables is
quite high. The factors that exert a positive effect on the size of the shadow economy
are the VAT revenues as a percentage of the GDP, the crisis dummy, the CT revenues
as a percentage of the GDP, the share of employment in the construction sector and the
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unemployment rate. On the other hand, the average years of education and the share
of employment in the agriculture and financial sector are negatively related to the size
of the shadow economy.
Table 2: The drivers of the shadow economy
Variable PIP Cond. Post. Cond Post . Cond. Post
Mean Std Sign
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education 0.926 -0.030 0.019 0.000
VAT (% of GDP) 0.882 0.791 0.189 0.995
Agriculture 0.880 -0.742 0.250 0.000
Crisis 0.859 0.015 0.005 1.000
Corporate Tax (% of GDP) 0.857 1.122 0.305 1.000
Financial Servs. 0.837 -0.753 0.203 0.000
Construction 0.660 0.317 0.137 1.000
Unemployment rate 0.489 0.320 0.325 0.986
Net migration 0.349 -0.005 0.002 0.006
Hours worked 0.316 0.185 0.300 0.502
Euro 0.197 -0.013 0.009 0.097
Fiscal pressure (% of GDP) (a) 0.192 0.528 0.460 0.798
Non Market Servs. 0.169 -0.296 0.218 0.044
Social contributions (% of GDP) 0.138 -0.497 0.436 0.032
Personal Income Tax (% of GDP) 0.124 -0.022 0.472 0.347
Inflation rate 0.104 -0.140 0.159 0.106
Interest rate 0.101 -0.057 0.095 0.145
Industry 0.100 -0.121 0.299 0.244
Wage Share 0.082 -0.057 0.121 0.215
Other Servs. 0.072 -0.071 0.295 0.308
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the ratio of the shadow economy to GDP
obtained by means of the CDA-BMA using all the indicators of tax pressure. The results reported
here correspond to the estimation of the top 10,000 models from the 1 million possible regressions
including any combination of the 20 variables. Prior mean model size is 10 whereas posterior mean
model size is 8.33. Variables are ranked by Column (1), the posterior inclusion probability. Columns
(2) and (3) reflect the posterior mean and standard deviations for the linear marginal effect of the
variable conditional on inclusion in the model, respectively. Column (4) denotes the sign certainty
probability, a measure of our posterior confidence in the sign of the coefficient. (a) The fiscal
pressure indicator employed in these regressions is the FPt excluding social contributions.
Note that these findings are in line with previous international evidence and cor-
roborate the intuition that taxes are among the key drivers of variations in the under-
ground economy. Moreover, the fact that variations in the tax pressure of the VAT
and CT are among the top determinants (i.e, with PIPs above the 50%) whereas the
PIT, the Social Contributions or the overall fiscal pressure are not significant, suggests
that fraud in these taxes might be of major importance. This result is partially in line
with previous studies of Gadea and Serrano-Sanz (2002) and Gonza´lez-Ferna´ndez and
Gonza´lez-Velasco (2015), who find evidence supporting the claim that changes in direct
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taxes (which include both the PIT and the CT) are those that have greater impact on
the size of the shadow economy.
A novel result that stems from this analysis is the role of education. The fact that
education appears as the most important determinant exerting a negative impact on
hidden activities has important policy implications and contradicts the negative view
emerging from the studies of Goneaga (2018) or De Neve et al. (2019) who suggest
that educative actions and informative policy measures aiming at curving the shadow
economy are not effective and enjoy a low receptiveness.
On the other hand, the positive effect observed in the crisis dummy and the un-
employment rate suggests that the shadow economy reacts to falls in output and to
the deterioration of the labor market as suggested by Lacko´ (2000) or Dell’Anno et al.
(2007). In these contexts, it seems likely that economic agents activate survival strategies
(such as household production or production and service for sale without registration),
which increase the size of the shadow economy.
Finally, it is observed that industry mix matters driving the shadow economy.
Whereas the share of construction increases underground economy, there is a negative
link between the share of financial services and agriculture and the shadow economy.
The observed negative link between the shadow economy and the share of employment
in the financial sector is in line with Schenider (2013) where he finds that in Euro-
pean countries, the growing use of electronic payment systems decreases the room for
opaque transactions. This, in turn, requires a developed financial sector with a signifi-
cant share of employment devoted to financial activities. In addition, the positive effect
of construction is in line with the finding that the greatest bags of undeclared work in
European economies are located in the construction sector (see the review of Schneider
and Williams (2013) pp 66-73 on the micro studies of Denmark and Germany). The
only variable that displays a somewhat unexpected effect is the share of employment in
agriculture given that most of the empirical international evidence suggest that a higher
share in the agricultural sector increases the size of the shadow economy, because of
local governments in rural areas enjoy a more limited ability to control the economy
(Vuletin, 2008). Nevertheless, while this argument may hold to explain cross-country
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differentials, it might not apply in a developed country such as Spain, where the regu-
lation and protection of the agricultural sector is high. In fact, the result obtained here
could be explained because of these regulations.
6.2 Robustness checks
The results presented so far rely on Bayesian econometric modeling. An implication
of Bayesian econometrics is that inferences drawn on the relevance of different regressors
depend on prior distributions assigned to the model parameters and to the models.
Often, Bayesian analysis try to avoid situations where the conclusions depend heavily
on subjective prior information. For this reason, some robustness checks with respect
the role of the priors are performed.
The g-prior specification
First, I consider fixed g-priors following Ferna´ndez et al. (2001) as it is the case of
the baseline g-prior, the BRIC which sets g = max
(
N ;K2
)
. In this group of priors
I also consider the (i) Unit information prior (UIP) which sets g = N ; the (ii) Risk
information criteria prior (RIC) where g = K2 and (iii) the Hannan-Quinn (HQ) g-prior
setting g = log(N)3. However, we also consider the (iv) Empirical Bayes prior (EBL) of
Liang et al. (2008) which is a model k specific g-prior estimated via maximum likelihood.
In this case g = max (0, Fk) where Fk =
R2
k
(N−1−k)
(1−R2k)
. Finally, I consider the Hyper-g
prior of Liang et al. (2008) who suggest a Beta prior on the shrinkage factor of the form
g
1+g ∼ Beta(1,
a
2 − 1) where in this specific case, a is set to 2.5, 3 and 4. Figure (6)
shows the PIPs for the different regressors when using different g-prior configurations.
As observed, the ranking of regressors and their relevance does not change significantly
due to changes in g for the set of significant regressors whereas only minor changes arise
for determinants of low importance.
Priors on the model space
I also check the sensitivity of the results to the Binomial prior in the model space. Here
I depart from the baseline specification of φ = K/2 and the parameter controlling model
size φ is set to produce models of prior size of 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16 regressors respectively.
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As observed in Figure (6), the effect of increasing the prior model size has a stronger
impact on the PIPs than the g-prior given that the employment of priors favoring a
large model size, increases slightly the PIPs of most of the determinants. However, for
most of the regressors, the use of large model size priors does not generate a change
in their classification. Only factors in close to the threshold of significance such as the
unemployment rate or the net migration increase substantially their PIPs up to the level
where they could be considered significant. Thus, the results obtained in the baseline
scenario appear to be robust and are not driven by the implementation of priors beliefs.
Figure 6: The role of priors
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7 Conclusions
This study investigates the evolution of the shadow economy in Spain during the
period 1986-2016 using the Currency Demand Approach by means of Bayesian Model
Averaging econometric techniques which have the advantage of accounting for model
uncertainty and reducing the biases implied by omitted variables.
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the use of a unique aggregate fiscal
pressure metric such as the overall fiscal pressure including social contributions, may
over-estimate the average size of the shadow economy. By integrating over the log-
marginal likelihoods of the MC3 sampling algorithm for a variety of tax indicators, a
new set of model weights is obtained. This allows to produce an estimate of the shadow
economy that accounts for the uncertainty with respect to the taxes driving the demand
of currency for hidden transactions. The average share of the underground economy as a
percentage of the GDP during 1986-2016 was the 18.2% whereas in 2016, the estimated
size was the 11.95%. The estimated figures of the shadow economy for the period under
consideration are in line with the averaged estimates of previous studies for the same
time frame. Nevertheless, a remarkable difference between previous analysis and the
estimated pattern stemming from this study is that the size of the shadow economy
depicts an inverted U shape time profile, with a marked reduction in the years after the
Great Recession.
With the estimates of the shadow economy in hand, the importance of the drivers
of the shadow economy in Spain is investigated by means of Bayesian Model Averaging
methods, and in particular by the inspection of the PIPs of the different variables. The
main finding of this exercise is that the key factors driving variations in the size of the
shadow economy are the taxes, the level of education and the distribution of employment
across sectors. The results of this analysis highlight the importance of the VAT and CT
as the key taxes driving the shadow economy, which suggests that policy-makers aiming
at decreasing the tax-fraud should focus compliance efforts on these taxes. As regards
the key role played by the education of the population, it seems desirable to continue
investing in this public good as it may have important economic returns in the future
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by lowering the size of the shadow economy. Finally, even if the share of employment in
the construction has decreased considerably with respect the values in the peak of the
housing bubble, the high importance of the construction sector driving the underground
economy from the historical point of view and its positive link with the size of the shadow
economy, suggests that labor inspections should be focused in this branch of activity.
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Appendix: Figures and Tables
Figure A1: The Evolution of Money Velocity in Spain
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Table A1: Data and descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Standard deviation Min Max Units / Definition Source
Currency 6.587E+10 1.490E+10 3.436E+10 8.994E+10 (constant euros 2010) BS, IMF
Monetary aggregate M1 2.977E+11 2.007E+11 8.397E+10 7.339E+11 (constant euros 2010) BS, IMF
Monetary aggregate M2 6.442E+11 2.679E+11 3.117E+11 1.092E+12 (constant euros 2010) BS, IMF
Monetary aggregate M3 7.869E+11 2.448E+11 4.367E+11 1.171E+12 (constant euros 2010) BS, IMF
Prices 0.7645 0.2139 0.38265 1.009 GDP deflator Pt=2010 = 1 De la Fuente (2017a)
Total FP (including social contribs) 0.305 0.023 0.237 0.339 % of the GDP STA, SS
Total FP 0.199 0.019 0.154 0.232 % of the GDP STA
Indirect FP 0.086 0.021 0.036 0.111 % of the GDP STA
Direct FP 0.112 0.011 0.092 0.133 % of the GDP STA
Value Added Tax FP 0.051 0.018 0.007 0.070 % of the GDP STA
Personal Income Tax FP 0.072 0.006 0.053 0.081 % of the GDP STA
Corporate Tax FP 0.025 0.007 0.017 0.045 % of the GDP STA
ln Real GDP 27.466 0.231 27.009 27.744 log of real GDP De la Fuente (2017a)
Unemployment rate 0.151 0.047 0.079 0.253 % of the active population De la Fuente (2017b)
Inflation rate 0.035 0.0270 -0.002 0.1106 Annual Inflation rate (%) De la Fuente (2017b)
Interest rate 0.055 0.051 0 0.158 3-months nominal interest rate (%) BS, ECB
Linear trend 16 9.0921 1 31 Linear numeric progression [1:1:31]
Quadratic trend 336 299.87 1 961 Quadratic numeric progression [1:1:961]
Euro 0.48 0.51 0 1 Dummy: takes a value of 1 in 2002-2016 and 0 otherwise
Crisis 0.19 0.4 0 1 Dummy: takes a value of 1 in 2008-2013 and 0 otherwise
Education 8.73 1.19 6.75 10.51 Average years of education De la Fuente (2017c)
Net migration 0.66 0.74 -0.61 2.39 % of total population De la Fuente (2017c)
Agriculture employment 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.11 % of total employment CE
Industrial employment 0.28 0.04 0.23 0.34 % of total employment CE
Construction employment 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.11 % of total employment CE
Non market services employment 0.25 0.03 0.18 0.31 % of total employment CE
Financial services employment 0.24 0.01 0.22 0.25 % of total employment CE
Other services employment 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.11 % of total employment CE
Wage share 0.56 0.02 0.51 0.59 % of total employment De la Fuente (2017b)
Notas: BS denotes Bank of Spain, ECB, European Central Bank, IMF International Monetary Fund , STA Spanish Tax Agency, SS Social Security, CE Cambridge Econometrics.
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Table A2: Estimates of the Shadow Economy of Figure (5)
Alternative Fiscal Indicators Model
Year FPA FP Indirect Direct VAT CT PIT Averaged
1986 20.07 21.31 13.72 16.22 12.23 20.73 15.09 16.24
1987 20.92 22.05 13.44 17.21 12.97 23.29 15.86 16.72
1988 20.92 21.91 13.57 16.96 13.12 22.81 16.20 16.98
1989 22.25 23.33 16.16 17.52 19.27 24.26 18.84 19.34
1990 21.62 22.79 15.91 16.97 18.99 23.72 18.59 18.85
1991 22.25 23.28 16.83 17.19 19.49 24.89 18.50 19.17
1992 24.77 26.05 21.02 17.95 25.41 26.85 18.67 21.08
1993 24.10 24.91 19.38 17.46 23.58 26.56 17.07 19.98
1994 24.69 26.15 20.79 18.11 25.52 26.97 17.15 20.23
1995 25.30 26.79 20.94 19.02 25.41 27.42 17.80 20.95
1996 24.04 25.30 19.93 17.82 24.32 25.39 17.19 20.09
1997 24.15 25.72 20.52 17.92 24.74 24.95 19.66 21.29
1998 23.90 25.47 20.43 17.48 24.43 24.75 19.48 21.18
1999 24.20 25.91 21.00 17.77 24.96 24.78 19.35 21.28
2000 23.35 24.63 20.53 16.33 24.68 23.92 19.40 20.91
2001 22.12 23.38 19.25 15.55 23.69 22.20 18.33 19.68
2002 21.62 22.87 18.73 15.44 22.77 21.86 18.44 19.45
2003 21.57 22.73 18.87 15.01 22.96 22.07 18.07 19.30
2004 21.30 22.68 18.88 14.86 23.32 21.56 18.46 19.40
2005 21.41 22.67 18.83 15.04 22.82 21.66 19.09 19.79
2006 20.98 22.61 18.58 15.20 22.62 20.58 19.10 19.57
2007 20.74 22.19 17.63 15.22 21.85 21.51 19.65 19.68
2008 19.29 20.47 16.18 13.98 20.62 20.09 15.96 16.98
2009 18.28 18.83 14.72 12.89 18.40 19.43 14.22 15.50
2010 18.58 19.61 16.06 12.89 20.49 19.61 13.19 15.42
2011 18.74 19.45 15.67 12.96 19.99 20.12 13.20 15.61
2012 18.26 19.24 15.31 13.04 19.92 19.12 13.95 15.67
2013 17.50 18.46 14.73 12.42 19.33 18.00 12.88 14.92
2014 16.34 17.44 14.02 11.60 18.90 17.20 11.87 13.87
2015 15.29 16.29 13.06 10.82 17.54 15.56 11.24 13.14
2016 13.95 15.14 12.04 10.03 16.72 14.09 10.33 11.95
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